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Abstract
This paper shows that in a borrowing-constrained economy, a median
level of inequality stimulates investment, whereas low and high levels of
inequality dampen investment. This nonlinearity is a result of two eects.
There are more rich individuals in an equal economy than in an unequal
economy. Therefore, more individuals can invest. However, in an equal
economy, rich individuals have less wealth than they would in an unequal
economy, which can dampen investment. My paper shows that these two
eects produce nonlinearity if investment is indivisible.
*JEL Classications:O11,O16
*Keywords: Income inequality; Economic development; Indivisible invest-
ment; Misallocation of capital.
1 Introduction
This paper shows that in a borrowing-constrained economy, there is an inverted
u-shaped relationship between income distribution and output (see gure 1). In
an extremely unequal economy, the ratio of agents who can invest is low and
output also becomes because there are many more poor individuals than in an
equal economy. However, in an extremely equal economy, rich agents cannot
invest and the output level is low because rich individuals have less wealth than
they would in an unequal economy. My paper shows that these two forces
produce a nonlinear relation between inequality and productivity.
In the empirical research, various studies examine the relationship between
inequality and economic growth. On the one hand, Alesina and Rodrik (1994)
and Persson and Tabellini (1994) state that inequality has a negative eect on
growth. On the other hand, Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) state that
inequality has a positive eect on growth. Banerjee and Duo (2003) nd an
inverted u-shaped relationship between inequality and growth.1 In addition,
This work was supported in part by Grants for Excellent Graduate Schools, MEXT,
Japan.
yGraduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7, Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka
560-0043, Japan. E-mail address: u847103e@ecs.osaka-u.ac.jp
1Chen (2003) also reports a similar relationship. Barro (2000) identies another type of
nonlinearity.
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Figure 1: Inequality and productivity
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Banerjee and Duo (2003) propose that the dierent results found in the liter-
ature are a result of nonlinearity. My paper aims to provide an explanation for
this inverted u-shaped relationship.
My model can be regarded as a formalized version of the idea of Banerjee
and Duo (2003). They propose that nonconcave production functions produce
nonlinearity. In an economy with a concave production function, the marginal
productivity of the capital of rich agents is lower than that of poor agents
because of decreasing returns to capital. Redistribution from rich agents with
low marginal capital productivity to poor agents with high marginal capital
productivity improves productivity. However, this relation does not necessarily
hold if the production function is not concave. The authors only provide a brief
explanation for this result because their main focus is on empirical issues. My
model is similar to their explanation in that I assume investment indivisibility.2
Indivisibility produces nondecreasing returns. Hence, redistribution from the
rich to the poor can dampen eciency.3 4 Also, it is important that only with
this frequently used concept, I can produce inverted u-shaped relation.
My model is also related to the literature on the misallocation of capital.5
Banerjee and Moll (2010) dene two types of capital misallocation. First, inten-
sive margin capital misallocation takes place if the marginal product of capital is
unequal among agents. Second, extensive margin capital misallocation occurs if
the number of investors is smaller than the optimum. Extensive margin capital
misallocation results from xed entry costs or indivisibility.
The model of Benabou (1996) can be viewed as a model of intensive margin
capital misallocation. He constructs a neoclassical growth model with an im-
perfect nancial market and states that the marginal product of capital is not
equal among agents due to nancial market imperfection. In addition, unequal
income distribution produces unequal marginal products of capital. That is, his
model states that inequality produces intensive margin capital misallocation.
There is no extensive margin misallocation because all agents invest.
In contrast to his model, productivity is determined by the number of agents
who participate in an investment project in my model. Hence, my model ana-
lyzes how the distribution of income aects eciency in an economy in which
extensive margin capital misallocation exists.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the basic structure of the model. Section 3 analyzes a case in which factor
prices are exogenously given, as in Galor and Zeira (1993). Section 4 analyzes a
2There is one shortcoming in this paper. Matsuyama (2011) claims that it is extreme to
assume that there is only one indivisible project in an economy. If we allow many indivisible
projects, the eect of redistribution changes. Despite this shortcoming, it is important to
investigate models with indivisible investment because many models use this assumption.
3Many papers address income distribution and indivisible investment. However, these
models do not nd an inverted u-shaped relationship.
4Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Li and Zou (1998) use
a political economics model to explain the relationship between economic performance and
inequality.
5Buera and Moll (2012), Caballero et al. (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009),Midrigan and
Xu (2010), Moll (2010), and Song et al. (2011) also address the misallocation of capital.
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Figure 2: The relationship between  and the endowment of a rich agent
case in which wages are endogenously determined, as in Banerjee and Newman
(1993) and Ghatak and Jiang (2002). Section 5 analyzes a case in which interest
rates are endogenously determined, as in Aghion and Bolton (1997). Section
6 analyzes a case in which the prices of these two factors are endogenously
determined. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
There is a continuum of agents. Each agent has an indivisible investment project
that converts one unit of goods at the beginning of the period into y units of
goods at the end of the period. There are two types of agent: rich and poor.
Each rich agent has er units of goods, which can be used to capital goods to
invest. Each poor agent has ep units of goods at the beginning of the period.
The initial endowment of the poor ep and the mean level of endowment e are
exogenously determined and ep < e. However, the endowment of rich agents er
is endogenously determined and satises er + (1   )ep = e and derd < 0 (see
gure 2). The ratio of rich agents is . A high value of  indicates an equal
income distribution.6
Each agent can choose between becoming a worker or an employer and has
L units of labor. By becoming a worker, the agent earns the competitive wage
rate v. In addition, she lends her endowment and earns interest at a rate of r per
unit of endowment. r is the exogenously determined world interest rate. Thus,
6Similar class structures are used in Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and Foellmi and
Zweimuller (2006).
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by becoming a worker, an agent with e units of endowment at the beginning of
the period will have re+ vL at the end of the period.
To become an employer, an agent needs to use one unit of capital to employ
one unit of labor as well as all of her labor force L. She needs to borrow 1 e units
of money to invest. The interest rate paid to lenders is r. This rate equals r in
sections 3 and 4. However, in section 5, I introduce an aggregate borrowing limit
and r can therefore dier from r. Details related to the aggregate borrowing
limit are discussed in section 5. Thus, the following inequality determines the
investment threshold.
re+ Lv  y   r(1  e)  v (1)
The left-hand side of (1) represents the opportunity cost of investing and
the right-hand side represents the return on the investment. If re + Lv <
y   r(1   e)   v is satised, the return on the investment is higher than its
opportunity cost. Agents decide to invest if the borrowing constraint is not
binding. The borrowing constraint is determined as follows.
r(1  e)  (y   v) (2)
That is, borrowers can only pay a fraction of their revenues (y   v). The
assumption that (0    1) in (2) has many justications. For example,
borrowers can steal a fraction of his prot equal to (1   )(y   v). If lenders
lend more than (y  v) of capital, borrowers have an incentive to steal. Hence,
lenders do not lend more than this amount of capital.7 8 If this constraint is
satised, agents can borrow to invest. Agents invest only if the investment is
protable and the borrowing constraint is satised, that is, if (1) and (2) are
satised.
I impose two assumptions throughout this paper. First, I assume that invest-
ment is productive, that is, that y > r. Second, I assume that an agent cannot
invest when e = e, v = 0, and r = r, or, put dierently, when y  r(1   e).
This assumption implies that poor agents cannot invest. Also, rich agents can
invest if and only if r(1   er)  y holds when v = 0 and r = r. I dene a
threshold e^ that satises r(1   e^) = y. This threshold implies that only rich
agents whose endowments are higher than e^ can invest when v = 0 and r = r. I
also dene a threshold ^ that satises ^e^+(1  ^)ep = e. This threshold implies
that only if  is lower than ^ do rich agents have an endowment greater than e^.
3 Exogenous factor prices
In this section, I assume that the interest rate and wage are constant at r = r
and v = 0, respectively. Protability condition (1) is satised automatically.
7See also Aghion et al. (1999), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), and Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) for other micro foundations.
8Inequality (2) means that only wealthy agents can invest. See Blanchower and Shadforth
(2007) and Evans and Jovanovic (1989) for the empirical validity of this argument.
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Hence, I only focus on borrowing constraint (2). Borrowing constraint (2) for
rich agents can be rewritten as follows.
r(1  er)  y
Rich agents invest if and only if (3) is satised (this is equivalent to  < ^).
If  < ^, aggregate investment is the ratio of rich since all rich agents invest and
poor agents cannot invest. Otherwise, aggregate investment is zero because all
agents cannot invest. We dene Y as an economy's total output. These relation
satised.
Y =
(
y if   ^
0 if ^ < 
This nonmonotonicity induces an inverted u-shaped curve (see gure 3).
In this section, investment returns are exogenously determined because factor
prices are constant. One may think that if factor prices were endogenously
determined, then the inverted u-shaped relationship would not hold because
whether borrowing constraint (2) is satised is determined not only by the
endowment but also by factor prices. This means that the borrowing limit is
also endogenously determined. In the following sections, we endogenize factor
prices. Will the inverted u-shaped relationship remain intact?
4 Endogenous wages
In this section, I assume that the interest rate is constant at r = r. Unlike the
previous section, however, I now include labor market and wage determination
mechanisms. Poor agents become workers because they cannot invest if v  0.
They are indierent to whether they become workers or are unemployed if v = 0.
Thus, the labor supply of poor agents lsp can be written as follows.
lsp =
(
(1  )L v > 0
[0; (1  )L] v = 0
Rich agents demand labor if v  v^  minf y rL+1 ; y   r(1 er) g. That is,
protability constraint (1) and borrowing constraint (2) are satised. If v > v^,
either constraint (1) or (2) is violated. Hence, all rich agents cannot invest and
supply labor. The labor supply is lsr = 0. Otherwise, if v^ > v, constraints (1)
and (2) are satised. Hence, all rich agents choose to invest. The labor supply
is lsr = .
If v = v^, there can be two outcomes. First, if v = y rL+1  y  r(1 er) , prots
from investment are zero. Rich agents are indierent to whether they invest
or lend money. The labor supply lsr and labor demand ldr of rich agents are
respectively determined as follows.
6
Figure 3:  and productivity
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lsr =
8><>:
L if v > v^
[0; L] if v = v^
0 if v < v^
ldr =
8><>:
0 if v > v^
[0; ] if v = v^
 if v < v^
Second, if v = y  r(1 er) < y rL+1 , there are positive prots from investment.
Borrowing constraints hamper the price mechanism. At rst, I consider a case
without borrowing constraint (2). If there is an excess supply of labor at this
wage rate, the price mechanism reduces the wage rate. If there is an excess
demand for labor, the rich agents who do not meet labor can oer wage v > v^.
However, the price mechanism does not work if borrowing constraint (2) is
binding.
Rich agents cannot oer wage v > v^ even if it is protable because they
cannot borrow when v > v^. To balance the labor market, some agents must be
credit-rationed, meaning that they cannot borrow beyond a certain limit. The
labor supply lsrL and labor demand of rich agents are determined by equations
(6) and (7), respectively.
Although the labor supply and demand are determined by equations (6) and
(7) in these two cases, there is one dierence. If (1) is binding, rich agents gain
equal utility since they are indierent to whether they invest or lend money. If
(2) is binding, this ex post equality among rich agents no longer holds. Credit
rationing hampers utility level equality among rich agents since constraint (1)
is not binding.
Figure 4 shows that if  < (1   )L and  < ^ hold, then the equilibrium
wage is zero because more labor is supplied by poor agents than is demanded by
rich agents. The equilibrium level of employment and investment is  because
all rich agents invest. Figure 5 shows that if (1   )L <  and  < ^ hold,
then the equilibrium wage is v = v^. If the equilibrium wage is zero, equilibrium
investment is . If the equilibrium wage is higher than zero, resource constraints
determine the equilibrium level of investment. The following three equations
dene the market equilibrium.
lsp + lsr = ldr (3)
lsr = L(   ldr) (4)
lsp = (1  )L (5)
Equation (3) represents labor market equilibrium conditions. It means that
the labor supply must be equal to the labor demand. Equations (4) and (5)
represent resource constraints. Equation (4) states that if lsr units of rich agents
8
Figure 4: Labor market equilibrium if  < (1  )L holds
invest, then the remaining    lsr units of rich agents supply L units of labor.
Because the wage rate is positive, agents who do not invest supply labor. The
equilibrium level of investment is equal to the labor demand ldr because the
labor demand is equal to the number of agents who invest.
If  < ^, then all agents cannot invest since v^ < 0.
In summary, an inverted u-shaped curve is identied.
Y =
8><>:
y if   LL+1
L
L+1y if
L
L+1 <   ^
0 if ^ < 
(6)
If ^  LL+1 , then v = 0 irrespective of  since the labor demand is less than
the labor supplied by poor agents. This case is the same as in section 3 and we
can think of section 3 as special case of this section.
The trapezoid presented in gure 6 indicates that there is an upper bound of
productivity. At the upper bound, full employment occurs. In section 3, there
is no full factor employment level. Hence, gure 3 does not present a trapezoid
but rather a triangle.
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Figure 5: Labor market equilibrium if (1  )L   holds
Figure 6: Inequality and output
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5 Endogenous interest rate
I analyze a model with an endogenous interest rate and exogenous wages. In
contrast to section 4, v is constant at zero. In addition, capital inows are
restricted. That is, domestic borrowers cannot borrow more than S units of
capital from abroad. To simplify the analysis, I introduce the concept of -
nancial intermediaries and agents can now borrow only through these lenders.
Why would agents borrow money through nancial intermediaries? Financial
intermediaries are superior with regard to lending because they have more in-
formation about borrowers than other lenders. Intermediaries can also borrow
at the world interest rate r. However, there is a limit to how much can be bor-
rowed from abroad.9 Why are nancial intermediaries constrained to borrow
only in foreign borrowing? For example, foreign lender valued only a fraction
of collateral of nancial intermediary. Hence, only domestic lenders are willing
to lend to intermediaries above the limit S.
I assume that the nancial intermediary sector is competitive. Financial
intermediaries lend money at interest rate r and borrow and lend as follows. If
r  r < r^, intermediaries decide to lend to rich agents and rich agents decide
to borrow money. If r^ < r, rich agents cannot borrow because either constraint
(1) or (2) is violated. If r^ = r, credit rationing occurs, as in section 4.
Poor agents cannot invest if r  r. The capital supply of poor agents is
(1  )ep.
As in the previous sections, rich agents can borrow money to invest if prof-
itability constraint (1) and borrowing constraint (2) are satised. I dene
r^  minfy; y1 er g. r^ indicates that if r is higher than r^, either constraint
(1) or (2) is violated.
Rich agents supply capital if r > r^ and demand capital if r < r^. If r = r^,
there are two possibilities. First, the protability constraint is binding and
rich agents are indierent to whether they invest or lend money. Second, the
borrowing constraint is binding. As in section 4, credit rationing occurs. Some
rich agents cannot borrow money even if (1) and (2) are satised. Rich agents
cannot post interest rate r > r^ even if it is protable since they cannot borrow
at r > r^. To balance the capital market, some agents must be credit-rationed,
meaning that they cannot borrow beyond a certain limit. I denote the capital
supply of rich agents to nancial intermediaries by ksr and the capital demand
of rich agents by kdr. The following equations are satised.
ksr =
8><>:
er if r > r^
[0; er] if r = r^
0 if r < r^
(7)
kdr =
8><>:
0 if r > r^
[0; (1  er)] if r = r^
(1  er) if r < r^
(8)
9Similar to the borrowing limit used in cabkris.
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Figure 7: Credit market equilibrium if   e+ S) holds
Figure 7 states that if   e+S), then the equilibrium interest rate is r and
the equilibrium level of investment is . Figure 8 states that if e+ S <  < ^,
then the equilibrium interest rate is r^ and the equilibrium level of investment is
e+ S. In this case, resource constraints determine equilibrium, as in section 4.
I dene I as the investment level. The equilibrium condition can be written as
follows.
ksr + ksp + S = kdr (9)
I   kdr = er   ksr (10)
ksp = (1  )ep (11)
Equation (10) represents capital market equilibrium conditions. If r > r,
nancial intermediaries borrow money as possible and lend money to rich agents
as possible. Equations (11) and (12) represent resource constraints. The left-
hand side of (11) means that capital used in rich investor. The right-hand side
of (12) represents the endowment of rich agents minus how much they lend.
Equation (12) represents how much poor agents lend. Figure 9 shows that if
e + S  ^, the relationship between inequality and output is similar to the
12
Figure 8: Credit market equilibrium if e+ S <  holds
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Figure 9: Inequality and output
case in section 4 (see equation (6)). If there is no full employment of capital
(e+ S > ^), the relationship is similar to the case in section 3.
Y =
8><>:
y if (  e+ S)
(e+ S)y if (e+ S <   ^)
0 if (^ < )
(12)
6 Endogenous wages and interest rate
I analyze a case in which wages and the interest rate are endogenously deter-
mined. This is slightly dicult because, in contrast to the previous sections,
factor prices move simultaneously. The equilibrium investment level I is equal
to the labor demand ldr. The equilibrium conditions can be written as follows.
lsp + lsr = ldr (13)
lsr
(
 L(   ldr) if v = 0
= L(   ldr) if v  0
(14)
lsp
(
 (1  )L if v = 0
= (1  )L if v > 0 (15)
ksr + ksp + S
(
 kdr if r = r
= kdr if r > r
(16)
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I   kdr = er   ksr (17)
ksp = (1  )ep (18)
If LL+1 < e+S, then the level of investment cannot take a value higher than
L
L+1 because if I = kdr = ldr >
L
L+1 , labor market equilibrium conditions (13),
(14), and (15) are not satised. Since kdr < s + S, ksp + S < kdr is satised.
Hence, r is equal to r irrespective of  from (16). This case can be analyzed as
in section 4.
Y =
8><>:
y if   LL+1
L
L+1y if
L
L+1 <   ^
0 if ^ < 
(19)
If e+S < LL+1 , then the level of investment cannot take a value higher than
e+S because if this condition is satised, capital market equilibrium conditions
(16), (17), and (18) are not satised. Since ldr < lsr + lsp, v is zero irrespective
of  from (14). This case can be analyzed as in section 5.10
Y =
8><>:
y if   e+ S
(e+ S) if e+ S <   ^
0 if ^ < 
(20)
7 Conclusion
In this model, inequality aects the ratio and wealth of rich agents. In section
3, changes in inequality have a nonlinear eect on output. From sections 4 to
6, there is a full employment level  and at this full employment level, small
changes in inequality do not change output in these regions. However, the model
with factor price movement produces an inverted u-shaped curve like the model
in section 3. Even if factor prices are endogenously determined, indivisible
investments produce an inverted u-shaped curve.
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